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SUMMARY. The current paper is an attempt to reconstruct the economic policy debates in Bulgaria 
around the Great Depression in the 1930s. The goal is twofold. Firstly, it is of interest to track down 
the development of Bulgarian economic thought in the inter-war period and to analyse its intellectual 
relationships to the evolution of European (especially German-language) political economy. Secondly, 
due to some significant analogies between the situation in the surveyed period and the current crisis, it 
seems possible to tentatively draw conclusions from the economists’ debates then as a contribution to 
crisis management and post-crisis development of Bulgaria today.
The paper is only secondarily interested in the quantitative economic history of the 1930s; instead, 
the primary objective is to show that history of economic thought as a discipline can give qualitative 
indications how past theoretical discourse can be inspiring both for conducting economic policy and 
for avoiding past mistakes.
Keywords: Great Depression, Bulgaria, economic policy, history of economic thought
Special gratitude is to be expressed to Dr M. Nenova for enabling me to spend the time at BNB as a 
visiting researcher productively, to Prof N. Nenovsky for the many inspiring discussions over the last two 
years, and last but not least to the BNB librarians who were of extreme help to me during the months 
spent mostly in the Bank’s library.
Stefan Kolev, Visiting Researcher at BNB (April – June 2009); PhD Candidate in Economics, Univer-
sity of Hamburg (Professor Dr. Elisabeth Allgoewer) / Hamburg Institute of International Economics 
(HWWI); kolev@hwwi.org
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1. Introduction
The Great Depression, beginning in late 1929 and persisting well into the 
1930s, has always been a focal point for researchers interested both in eco-
nomic history and in history of economic thought. Not only was this period 
a time-span of major economic, political and social distress. What might be 
perceived as equally important is the fact that at that moment economics 
as a branch of social science faced substantial changes, partially due to the 
severe criticism which was addressed to it from the public. According to pub-
lic opinion, it had failed in preventing the Depression and thus was largely 
perceived, just as during the 19th century, as the dismal science which is of 
no real use for the progress of society.1
Crises are, however, often a culmination and a new beginning at the 
same time.2 This is true for economic, as well as for intellectual crises, and 
the Great Depression was certainly both. At a time of severe disturbances, 
social sciences and economics in particular have achieved substantial innova-
tions in their development. Adam Smith and the beginning of the Industrial 
Revolution, David Ricardo and the Napoleonic wars or Karl Marx and the 
bourgeois revolutions of 1848 are good examples supporting this hypoth-
esis. The time of the Great Depression and its aftermath constitute also such 
a time. The coming up of Keynesian macro-economics is probably the most 
lasting remainder of these “years of high theory”, as they are called.
But this is by far not all. The debates around this “great crisis of capital-
ism” are not only interesting in a purely scientific respect, but also as a promi-
nent example for (some) economists being willing to exit the ivory tower of 
academia and generate policy advice, both for politicians and the general 
public. Such discussions in the Western countries have been well studied 
by historians of economic thought.3 Countries like Bulgaria, however, which 
do not have a long tradition in economic reasoning and are besides small 
economies, have up to now not been in the center of interest. The current 
paper attempts to fill a part of this gap.
Bulgarian economists in the inter-war period are generally not perceived 
as being a part of a genuinely own tradition in economics, unlike e.g. their 
1 For an analysis of the deficiencies and “intransparency” of the German-language debate see Hage-
mann, H. (2009).
2 See Неновски, Н. (2007), p. 13.
3 For the exposure of Austrian economists in popular newspapers in Vienna during the Depression see 
Klausinger, H. (2005).
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Polish or Hungarian colleagues of that time.4 This leads to the common re-
proach in the few Bulgarian publications covering their work that they are 
“epigones” of foreign intellectual developments.5 The current article cannot 
deal with this accusation in detail since it would require a profound compara-
tive analysis of the significant volume of economic publications in the time 
until 1944. What will, however, be an important thesis in the paper is that 
the (semi)academic discussions in the three selected journals of that period 
do not substantially differ in quality and sophistication from the debates in 
the Western world. Of course, the influence of the Youngest German His-
torical School, of Marxist economics or (to a smaller extent) of the Austrian 
School of Economics can be tracked down and is an important feature of 
the discourse among Bulgarian economists. This, however, according to the 
author is less than a sign of being “epigones” of foreign thinkers. Instead, this 
fact can be interpreted as a laudable willingness of Bulgarians to be in line 
with the Western debates about which they are obviously well informed. The 
reproach of “provincialism” is thus turned to the opposite: the economic 
community in Bulgaria at that time was at least as open and probably more 
in line with the Western discourse than it seems to be the case today.6
The structure of the paper is to be briefly outlined here. The exposition 
will begin with some brief stylized facts about the situation in Bulgaria during 
the late 1920s and early 1930s, showing what the major symptoms of the 
Depression were in the specific Bulgarian context. In a next step, some initial 
analogies from this economic-historical setting will be drawn with respect to 
the comparability of the country situation then and now. Then the core of 
the paper will begin with its two layers. First, the general economic policy 
debate will be presented, a debate more focused on the structural long-term 
aspects of economic policy and the role of government in them. In a second 
step, the anti-cyclical short-term proposals will be analyzed. One of the ma-
jor theses of the paper will be that although a separability of the two layers 
seems desirable, it is often difficult to attain since the Bulgarian economists 
in their majority see the cyclical phenomena as densely intertwined with the 
overall structural problems of the economy.
A brief remark on the methodology of the study might be in place now. 
In the relatively short period of the stay at the BNB the author was able 
to analyze three of the major economic periodicals in Bulgaria at the time 
4 For an interesting contribution on the early Bulgarian tradition in History of Economic Thought see 
Юрданов, Ю. (1935).
5 See Аврамов, Р. (2007), pp. 348–392.
6 A prominent example for this “openness”-hypothesis are the extensive publications of Prof. Dr. Geor-
gi Swrakoff in the 1930s and 1940s in first-rate German economic journals where he is a welcome 
reviewer of major Western thinkers, e.g. of a pioneering book of the founding father of German ordo-
liberalism, Walter Eucken, see i.a. Swrakoff, G. (1939).
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of the Depression. These are Списание на Българското Икономическо 
Дружество (Journal of the Bulgarian Economic Association, JBEA), 
Стопанска мисъл (Economic Thought, ET)7 and Архив на стопанската 
и социална политика (Archive for Economic and Social Policy, AESP). Of 
course this selection is far from complete, but the time restraint only allowed 
for this. All three journals were analyzed beginning with the issues of late 
1929 and continuing well into the 1930s. The three were selected after a 
careful research of previously conducted analyses of the period8 in order 
to allow for some representativity (JBEA being the most official publication 
of the community) and simultaneously to depict some heterogeneity of the 
economists’ profession in Bulgaria at that time (ET being a more theoretical 
series than JBEA, and AESP being affiliated to social-democrat doctrines).
Overall, this study suggests that today’s economic policy advisors in Bul-
garia may well learn a lot from their predecessors’ experience in the 1930s. 
Since both the situation of the Bulgarian economy and the nature of the glo-
bal crisis then and now are not dramatically different, it might indeed prove 
helpful to take a detailed look at the debates back in the 1930s. Of course 
history never repeats itself, but it would be good not to repeat the mistakes 
of the past. For this reason the economic profession might itself be well 
advised to spend more time on the history of its own thought, something 
which is unfortunately more and more neglected in the teaching of today’s 
mainstream economics at modern universities. The current paper may be 
perceived as a marginal contribution to the contrary.
2. Description of the Bulgarian Great Depression 1930–1935
This paper is focused on history of economic thought, not on economic 
history, so this part of it should remain brief. In the last years, there have been 
some publications trying to reconstruct the data regarding the economic 
development of Bulgaria in this period,9 so a brief sketch based on the cycle 
reviews in the three journals should suffice here.
The Bulgarian crisis10 started somewhat later than its global counterpart, 
namely in the second half of 1930, and the initial shock did not come from 
the bubble on Wall Street.11 It was the bursting of another bubble that af-
7 Since from the publications themselves it does not become absolutely clear when the first volumes 
of this journal appeared (late 1929 or early 1930), the author decided to quote the first collection of 
papers as 1930, vol. 1.
8 The most encompassing œuvre of the Communist period probably is the two-volume edition of 
Натан, Ж., К. Григоров, Л. Беров, Ст. Мечев, Т. Трендафилов (1973).
9 See most notably the works of Dr. Roumen Avramov and Dr. Martin Ivanov.
10 For an interesting quantitative and graphical analysis of the Bulgarian development prior to the crisis 
see Михайлов, Н. (1930а), pp. 50–55.
11 For the extremely rapid spread of the initially purely financial crisis from the USA to Europe see 
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fected the economy in the whole of South-Eastern Europe much more se-
verely and directly: the end of the chaos on the agricultural market.12 Since 
Bulgarian economy of that time was primarily agriculture-oriented (some 
estimates suggest that around 80 per cent of the population were engaged 
in this sector)13, the rapid and sharp plummeting of the prices, e.g. wheat 
prices, had a very deep impact on the country.14 Bulgaria’s agriculture was, 
according to analyses of economists of that time, highly inefficient when 
compared to the productivity of other European and especially to North-
American farmers.15
The problem became even more serious due to the credit boom in the 
economy between 1927 and 192916 which directly preceded the slump.17 
The credit expansion was generated by the exterior influx of capital, both 
from the stabilization credits to government and from private, mostly Ameri-
can short-term18 funds.19 In this boom many farmers were willing to accept 
credits from financial institutions which turned out to be only payable if the 
high prices for their products as before the slump would persist.20 The ensu-
ing farmers’ debt crisis is a characteristic and very often pronounced feature 
both of the economists’ and the politicians’ debate about the crisis.21 The 
stability of the political system, weak as it was in that period, was additionally 
endangered by this phenomenon.22
A feature which Bulgaria has in common with other economies in the De-
pression is the extremely steep drop in the general price level, both whole-
sale and retail. Although it was the time when price indices were just being 
conceived and implemented,23 there is overwhelming evidence in the re-
views in JBEA that for the first years of the crisis prices went down by about 
Ботушаров, Д. (1930). For an analysis of the price development before the Depression see Ляпчев, 
А. (1932), pp. 531–533.
12 For some numbers on this agricultural bubble in the pre-crisis years see Ляпчев, А. (1930), p. 497 
and p. 510. For an early analysis of the spread of the impulse after the burst of the bubble see 
Кръстев, С. (1930б), pp. 101–103. A retrospective analysis in the bubble with time-series can be 
found in Каменаров, Н. (1933), pp. 24–25.
13 See Бобчев, К. (1931б), pp. 471–472.
14 See е.g. Цанков, Ал. (1932), pp. 10–12.
15 See Бобчев, К. (1931б), p. 474.
16 For an overview of the development of the credit system in Bulgaria before the crisis, including some 
time series, see Кръстев, С. (1930а).
17 For the ensuing credit crunch and rise of credit interest see Чакалов, Ас. (1930), p. 223.
18 For the primarily short-term character see Чакалов, Ас. (1934б), p. 201.
19 For the first signs of withdrawal of such funds from Bulgaria as early as the beginning of 1930 see 
Чакалов, Ас. (1930), p. 222.
20 See Загоров, Сл. (1933а) as well as Чолаков, Ст. (1932), pp. 142–143.
21 See e.g. the discussion in Цанков, Ал. (1932), pp. 10–12.
22 For an overview of the political dynamics in Bulgaria in the early 1930s, see Джидров, П. (1930), 
pp. 66–71.
23 For the state of their implementation in the Bulgarian context see Загоров, Сл. (1935).
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40 per cent, a figure which is even higher than those in Western European 
economies.24 This severe deflation was, together with high unemployment 
figures, certainly one of the most painful symptoms of the overall slump and 
phased out somewhat in the mid-1930s.25
The outcome of these economic difficulties was a strong drop in both 
exports and imports.26 The current account, however, was not in a particular 
disequilibrium, probably also due to the so called “foreign exchange monop-
oly” which was institutionalized at the BNB and imposed drastic measures 
on financing of imports. The reasoning of the Bulgarian economists about 
this arrangement will be found below.
An accompanying phenomenon was also the major distress in the finan-
cial sector of the economy. Various banks went bankrupt; many others were 
compelled to merge. Since the capital market was hardly developed at that 
time,27 difficulties for banks, being thus the only source of finance, automati-
cally lead to further repercussions on the real sector.28
Interestingly, the Depression continued longer in the Bulgarian context 
as compared to the Western economies. Unlike the saying of modern text-
books on economic history which very often mark the end of the crisis with 
193329, Bulgarian problems persisted well into 1934 and ended as late as 
1935.30
This was again due to the predominant agricultural sector which saw only 
a slow recovery from the shock and was on top plagued by some bad har-
vests in this period.
24 For some indications of the early sharp slump in prices see Чакалов, Ас. (1930), pp. 223–224. An 
international comparison of the price development until 1933 can be found in United Nations (1933). 
Highly valuable time-series for different countries, also separated according to their currency arrange-
ment, can be found in Христофоров, Ас. (1936а), p. 177 (wholesale price indices), p. 179 (retail price 
indices) and p. 181 (wages).
25 For the only slight improvements in the course of 1935 see Чакалов, Ас. (1935б), pp. 436-441.
26 The degree of openness of the Bulgarian economy is discussed in the analysed publications. Interest-
ingly, some state that it belongs to the European countries with a relatively low proportion of exports 
and imports to national income (see also footnote 33). The openness with respect to capital flows is 
significantly higher; see Бобчев, К. (1932В), pp. 665–666. For an estimate that the Bulgarian foreign 
trade dropped in the first three years of the crisis by more than 50 per cent, see Тодоров, Д. (1933), 
p. 16.
27 See Мишайков, Д. (1934), pp. 638–641.
28 For an outstandingly detailed analysis of the Bulgarian banking system during the crisis see 
Кемилев, Ас. (1936).
29 For a similar assessment of a contemporary Bulgarian economist see Христофоров, Ас. (1936а), 
pp. 175–176.
30 For a contemporary judgement that the year 1935 is the turning point for Bulgaria’s crisis see 
Христофоров, Ас. (1936б), p. 237, as well as Христофоров, Ас. (1936В), pp. 437–438.
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3. First Analogies between the Great Depression 
and the Current Situation in Bulgaria
Before turning to the scientific debate in the 1930s, some striking similari-
ties between the description of the Bulgarian crisis then and now can be out-
lined here. These can be perceived by the reader as a first strong claim that 
the debate reconstruction might also be seen as at least partially applicable 
to the current difficulties.
The first feature is a mass-psychological one and is thus difficult to verify 
but seems nevertheless hardly negligible. In the 1920s and 1930s the public 
and the economics profession shared one opinion of particular interest: the 
thesis of a perennial and not only cyclical crisis. That is to say that the De-
pression after 1929 is not to be seen as a purely isolated slump, but more 
in the broader perspective of a crisis which started right after the Balkan 
wars 1912–1913.31 Of course, the severity of the Depression was different 
from the preceding periods, and of course the period 1912–1929 was not 
uniformly bleak, i.e. there were some sub-periods where a temporary pros-
perity could be felt, as in the credit boom of 1927–1929. Overall, from a 
psychological perspective, the Depression seemed as a culmination point of 
something lasting for more than 15 years.
The analogy to the current Bulgarian public opinion is evident. The 20 
years between 1989 and 2009 have been a period of transition, including 
permanent transformation and also distress for many citizens. Of course, it 
cannot be denied that the years directly before the 2009 slump have been 
objectively years of stable macroeconomic growth in many indicators. As 
people seem, however, to be lagging the realization of such a process, there 
are large layers of the population who still live a life characterized by a sub-
jective opinion of crisis. The credit boom of the recent years and the inflow 
of Western FDI have certainly strongly improved the situation. But even in 
prosperous Sofia the saying “we have been in a crisis for 20 years, so we are 
not afraid of some Western financial crisis” can often be heard these days.
The second analogy is concerns the setting of Bulgarian economy in the 
global context then and now. The first wave of globalization, as economic 
historians agree, characterized the world before the outbreak of the Great 
War. After it, in the 1920s, there were significant efforts to overcome the 
war-induced obstacles and to come back to global economic integration. 
The comeback of the Gold Standard in many countries during the 1920s 
was probably the most visible sign of this development. So the period before 
31 A prominent proponent of this thesis is a former Prime Minister – Professor Alexander Zankoff, 
see Цанков, А. (1932). This is also shared by social-democratic theorists, see e.g. Николов, Д. (1934), 
p. 25.
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1929 can be seen as a time of increasing international interdependence.32 
The same is the picture of today’s Bulgaria in the current second wave of 
globalization. In both time-spans Bulgaria can be classified as a small open 
economy, strongly intertwined with the exterior world especially by capi-
tal flows.33 Thus Bulgaria is strongly susceptible in both periods to external 
shocks on the global markets, be they financial or real sector shocks. Moreo-
ver, its characterization as a small economy imposes a strong constraint on 
the quantitative impacts which its own economic policy can generate in such 
a setting. This will be further discussed below.
A third striking similarity is the currency arrangement which frames the 
economy in the 1920s and today. In 1928, after many preceding steps, the 
lev was eventually fixed to a gold parity and a Gold-Exchange Standard was 
introduced by law.34 Thus the monetary circulation was guaranteed not only 
by the gold stock of the BNB, but also by the foreign currency reserves in the 
Bank of gold-covered currencies (which were the predominant ones before 
1929). This setting strongly reminds of the Currency Board implemented in 
Bulgaria 1997. Both arrangements pose a specific constraint on Bulgarian 
monetary policy which is not as free as it would be in a purely fiat money 
standard.
A fourth characteristic which the crises then and now have in common 
is the dynamics of the pre-crisis period. As it was briefly mentioned in the 
preceding chapter, the period before 1929 can be described as a phase of 
credit expansion or even credit boom. This is true both in Bulgarian and in 
international context. The Western European banking system was flooded 
by easy money coming mostly from the United States and this was then 
forwarded to some more peripheral economies like Bulgaria. The analogy to 
the period before 2007–2008 can hardly be overlooked. In this period two 
(related) sources of easy money were present: the policy of the FED, ECB & 
Co., as well as the huge amounts of FDI flowing into Bulgarian economy. Al-
though it is true that the Austrian theory of the business cycle does not oblig-
atorily belong to the common explanations of the crisis within the economic 
profession in Bulgaria at that time,35 the fact of the preceding credit boom 
32 See e.g. Михайлов, Н. (1932б), pp. 458–459.
33 I agree with Dr. Roumen Avramov’s remark at the presentation of a draft of this paper at the BNB 
that trade was not a strong channel of integration during the 1920s and thus Bulgaria was a relatively 
closed economy if judged by its trade flows (see also footnote 26). Migration as the third channel of 
integration is certainly also present, but both in the early 1930s and today the big waves of emigra-
tion belong to the past, émigrés’ numbers being stagnant or declining, see Илиев, Ив. (1935). For an 
assessment of the role of migration in alleviating economic crises see Бурилков, Ж. (1935б), p. 602.
34 For the distinction between the „classical” gold standard and the gold-exchange standard in Bulgaria 
and an evalutation of the latter see Стоянов, П. (1930), pp. 21–23. Another critical assessment, as a 
response to Стоянов, can be found in Каменаров, Н. (1930).
35 One of the mentionings of Ludwig von Mises in the context of his diagnosis of the Depression can 
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seems (from today’s perspective) to be a theoretically interesting feature of 
the cyclical development in the 1920–1930s and in the 2000s.
So far, some first sketches have been delivered regarding the economic 
history of this period with a special comparative reference to today’s situa-
tion. Having done this, now the core of this paper will be presented, focusing 
on the fascinating debate in the Bulgarian economic community during the 
1930s.
4. The Еconomic Policy Debate of Bulgarian Economists 
аfter 1929
The aim of this core chapter is to give a well-structured overview of how 
Bulgarian economists saw the Great Depression and what their answers 
were to the challenges of this period. The intention of the author is not to 
show every detail of the discourse in the journals analyzed, but moreover to 
reconstruct the main lines of thought which characterize the publications.
What is (from a methodological point of view) characteristic for the de-
bate, is the interception of two layers of argumentation which are nowadays 
classical for economic policy research, but which were new at the time of 
the publications. The dominating one is the structural level of advice, regard-
ing the long-term oriented policies of the general economic development of 
Bulgaria, most importantly the attraction and accumulation of (internal and 
external) capital.36 The second is the more short-term oriented layer, con-
cerned with the direct cyclical difficulties of the Depression.37 From the point 
of view of German ordo-liberalism, which as a science of economic policy 
came up precisely in this period, both layers depicted by this school, i.e. 
the so-called policy of order (Ordnungspolitik) and the policy of process 
(Ablaufpolitik) are present in Bulgarian debates. Of course, it is difficult to 
separate them, especially since for the Youngest Historical School, to which 
most Bulgarian economists belong as they received education in Germany, 
the distinction is only of secondary importance.38 Another peculiarity of the 
debate, which is of significance for the reconstruction pattern and which 
also probably emanates from the German educational background of most 
be found in Бoбчeв (1933б), pp. 212–213. For Mises’ monetary reform proposals, as contrasted to 
these of Keynes and Cassel, see Стоянов, П. (1930), pp. 25–26. Hayek is only mentioned in a bibliog-
raphy when his Prices and Production appears 1931.
36 See e.g. Цанков, Ал. (1932), pp. 13. On the role of saving for internal capital generation see 
Иванов, Ал. (1933), p. 10. For a discussion of the role of external capital inflows in the Bulgarian 
economy see Бурилков, Ж. (1934б).
37 The terms “structural” (структурен) and “cyclical” (конкюнктурен) are widely used, see e.g. 
Цанков, Ал. (1932), p. 8.
38 For an exception with rather an ordo-liberal position of government as setter of rules of the game 
and not an active player see Мишайков, Д. (1934), p. 641.
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Bulgarians at that time, is the tenet that economic policy is not a separated 
issue from the problems of social policy.
Thus in the following a stress is put on the interdependence of structural 
and cyclical policy proposals, but nevertheless for the sake of clarity an at-
tempt is made to dissect them. As regards social policy recommendations, 
which are very common in the texts,39 they will be subsumed in the chapter 
on structural economic policy, as they are of rather long-term significance 
and cannot be implemented in time to handle the Depression which was 
already in process.
4.1. Structural Policy: What is the Long-term Path of 
Development of Bulgaria?
4.1.1. The Role of Government in Economic Policy
There are of course various economic policy debate issues that can be 
attributed to the label “structural policy”. One of them, the ever-present and 
central topic of the general role of government in economic policy can be 
put forward. A quick comparative view at the German-language debate of 
that time40 shows that exactly in that time of severe crisis in the capitalist 
order, the question as to what the legitimate mixture of state and market is 
became even more pressing than it had been in the decade after the War. 
The answers in Germany are manifold, the upcoming of the Freiburg School 
of ordo-liberalism being the most lasting result of the debate.
In Bulgaria41 the question was controversial for one additional country-
specific sub-topic. This debate in Western countries is complex itself, but 
in the Bulgarian context a special attention was drawn to the role of gov-
ernment in a “young economy”.42 This was the name which the authors 
often attached to the problem of a relatively short independent economic 
development since 1879. Due to this reason, an interesting and sometimes 
puzzling consensus arises between the two fractions of liberals43 and inter-
39 Alexander Zankoff’s main statement is that the social (and possible political) distress is at least as 
important as the purely economic disturbances, see Цанков, Ал. (1932). For a similar stance, see 
Янулов, Ил. (1933), p. 71–74.
40 The author of the current article has conducted a part of his PhD research on this topic.
41 For an outstanding contribution regarding the compatibility of capitalism and the specificity of Bul-
garian development see Бочев, Ст. (1931), pp. 69–78.
42 See Бобчев, К. (1930), pp. 213–214 as well as Бобчев, К. (1931б), pp. 484–485. See also 
Мишайков, Д. (1934), p. 619.
43 The term “liberal” is employed in the entire paper in the (classical) European, not in the American 
sense.
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ventionists44, the two groups characterizing the whole debate in Bulgaria45 
(as everywhere else46). The line of consent is that even for economists per-
ceived otherwise as liberals, the role of government should be an active one, 
strongly fostering the development of the often inefficient structures in the 
country. This means that, unlike the few remaining liberals in Western Europe 
(who in their majority still believe that government should be no more than 
a rule-of-law arbiter of the otherwise autonomous private agents), in Bulgaria 
a call for the strong hand of a true player in the economy can be almost47 
unanimously heard.48
Below this most general line of dispute which can be traced back in al-
most every year of the journals analyzed, manifold more concrete debates 
take their course and are often shining back on the role of government-issue.
4.1.2. Free Trade vs. Protectionism
What accompanied Bulgarian politicians and academia from the incep-
tion of the Third Bulgarian Kingdom to 1944, was the constant issue about 
the appropriate foreign trade regime for Bulgaria.49 The line of division, sepa-
rating again interventionists from liberals,50 is the separation between the 
adherents of protectionism and the adherents of free trade.51 There is some 
similarity in the chain of argumentation when compared to the previous par-
agraph when looking at the reasoning of the proponents of liberalism. They 
often stress that as economists, they cherish the benefits of the international 
division of labour. However, “free-traderism” of the Manchester school origin 
seems to them out-of-date. Especially for the context of a relatively under-
44 For an explicit mentioning of the two camps and terming them (after Ludwig von Mises) “inter-
ventionists” and “liberals” in the debate see Бобчев, К. (1931a), pp. 360-361. See also Калинов, Д. 
(1935а), p. 65.
45 For an interesting exposition of the conflict between liberalism and interventionism in Bulgaria, the 
obituary of the prominent Bulgarian politician and economist Andrey Lyapcheff might be instructive; 
see Бобчев, К. (1933В).
46 Preliminary results of this paper were presented at a conference on May 20th 2009 by the Minis-
try of Finance on the occasion of its 130th anniversary. A similarly targeted paper was presented by 
Professor Michalis Psalidopoulos on the experience of Greece in the Great Depression. Without any 
coordination in advance between us, Professor Psalidopoulos characterized the two most significant 
groups in the Greek debate as “liberals” and “interventionists”.
47 I thank Dr. Roumen Avramov for his comment at the presentation at the BNB and after reviewing 
the respective publications agree with him that Stoyan Bocheff must be viewed as a notable exception 
from this consensus; see Бочев, Ст. (1935) and especially Бочев, Ст. (1931).
48 For an enumeration of criteria for such an activist state by the otherwise liberal economist Kon-
stantin Bobtcheff see again Бобчев, К. (1930), pp. 219–220. The stance of former Prime Minister 
Alexander Zankoff who pessimistically sees interventionism gaining the upper-hand during and after 
the Depression is also of interest, see Цанков, Ал. (1932), pp. 18–19.
49 For a historical exposition of the Bulgarian debate on this issue which “has been a century-long 
controversy of economic science” see Бобчев, К. (1935), pp. 466–467.
50 Alternative labels borrowed from the Viennese economist Othmar Spann are “individualists” vs. 
“universalists”, see Екимов, Ив. (1932), pp. 638–640.
51 For a liberal argumentation against the ideal of autarky see e.g. Цанков, Ал. (1932), pp. 4–5.
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developed and agrarian country as Bulgaria, they (intuitively) tend to cling to 
Friedrich List’s “nascent industry” argument. Thus liberals and interventionists 
can be distinguished not so much according to their conclusion, which is 
that some tariff protection is indispensable.52
Two other principle differences arise, however, which allow for a certain 
separation of the two “camps”. The first is the acceptance of free trade ben-
efits in general and the second is the mode of development which is desir-
able for the post-crisis development.53 As regards the first, interventionists 
unlike liberals see in an opening of the economy a potential weakness due 
to the increased susceptibility to external shocks. As for the second, that pe-
riod saw the building of commercial blocs (such as the Sterling bloc around 
the UK) and hence the global multilateral integration (with its peak in 1914) 
to disintegrate.54 Bulgarian economists uniformly realize that the small size 
of Bulgaria’s market makes it absolutely necessary to participate in some 
form of economic integration.55 The division is visible, however, between the 
large majority who increasingly favoured a bilateral trade adherence to the 
German bloc via clearing contracts56 and those who preferred a multilateral 
solution.57 During the 1930s, the latter became more and more unrealistic 
due to the pre-war processes in the West.58 An additional impediment to 
multilateral trade flows and in favour of bilateral clearing agreements are 
the strong exchange controls which are instituted in many countries of that 
period, including in Bulgaria at BNB59 as discussed below.
4.1.3. Free Competition vs. Cartels
A related topic which is not quite as prominent in the discussions but 
still is worth dissecting, is the internal trade regime, i.e. the debate between 
adherents of free competition and those of cartels and monopolies.60 Again, 
the stylized separation into liberals and interventionists bears some explana-
tory power. The major line of division is whether competition is to be judged 
52 For an articulation of this consensus, see Михайлов, Н. (1932б), pp. 443–444.
53 On the second, see Пеев, Хр. (1932).
54 For an assessment of the dynamics of this development see e.g. Кръстев, С. (1933), pp. 46–47.
55 See e.g. Бобчев, К. (1931б), p. 489.
56 One of the first treaties was signed in June 24th 1932. For an assessment of the integration between 
Germany and South-East European economies see Пиперов, Ив. (1936) or Тошев, Д. (1934).
57 For an exposition of the specificities of the trade regime for agrarian economies see Свраков, Г. 
(1931).
58 For an interesting analysis of the political economy of autarky (with a mentioning of Walter Eucken’s 
seminal article of 1932) and its relation to the arguments for a planned economy, see Петров, Н. 
(1933), pp. 62–65. Another mentioning of the same article of Eucken can be found in Божинов, С. 
(1933), p. 138–139.
59 For a discussion of the individual foreign exchange regimes in different countries in the beginning of 
the 1930s see Калинов, Д. (1935б), pp. 278–280.
60 According to one participant in the discussion, cartels and trusts have “undoubtedly buried classical 
liberalism”, see Пеев, Хр. (1932), p. 630.
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in a positive or in a negative manner.61 A predominant tendency can be dis-
covered in the texts in this respect to speak of (in Marxist language) the prob-
lems of “anarchistic character of competition”62 which can also be seen as 
one of the reasons for the Depression.63 A minority is speaking of the great 
benefits of competition, e.g. regarding the incentives for dynamic economic 
development. Bulgarian economists spend of course some thoughts on the 
issue of anti-trust policies and are generally in favour of some intervention 
of government to curtail monopolies and cartels.64 Unlike in upcoming Ger-
man ordo-liberalism, however, they do not propose this due to a particular 
cherishing of competition, but rather from the injustice perspective that the 
“unfairly high prices” imposed by such non-competitive actors are an im-
pingement on the individual customer’s budget. Interestingly, even some ar-
gumentation can be traced down which states that cartels can be of use for 
stabilizing prices especially during such slumps as the Depression.65
4.1.4. Market Economy vs. Planned Economy
Collective entities like cartels, thought to the end, tend according to 
Schumpeter to be a step towards a collectivist or centrally planned economy. 
Looking at the experience of Soviet Russia, as well as at the fundamental 
Western discussions of the 1920s and 1930s regarding the possibility and 
desirability of a planned economy,66 Bulgaria’s economists pose the question 
as to whether “time has come” for a switch from the market to a planned 
economy.67 The issue is strongly related to the Depression, since Soviet Rus-
sia obviously (despite mass famine) succeeds in convincing the world that 
the Great Depression has hardly affected its economy.68 Together with the 
“anarchistic competition” argument stated above, this leads to the question 
whether planned economy is at least a temporary device in times of crisis. 
This would mean that in periods characterized by such significant slumps, 
government is to take the initiative from the privates and thus prevent the 
chaos of (in Keynes’ words) self-accelerating private investors’ herd behavior 
to the bottom. However, a consensus emerges in the Bulgarian periodicals 
(not shared by AESP authors) that the solution cannot be sought in such a 
61 For a balanced analysis of both sides see Стоянов, К. (1934), pp. 311–312. For an emphasis on 
the fight against “unfair” competition and an agenda for competition policy see Близнаков, Т. (1936).
62 See e.g. Калинов, A. (1931), pp. 329–330. 
63 See Калиниов. Т. (1932), p. 25.
64 For a discussion of the Bulgarian legislation on cartel and monopoly prices passed in 1931 see 
Бобчев, К. (1932a), pp. 44–45.
65 For this argument see Петров, Н. (1931), pp. 93–94.
66 For an assessment of the first Five-Year-Plan see Николов, Д. (1933).
67 For a theoretical overview of the different possible sub-types of planned economies see Бочев, Ст. 
(1935).
68 For a relatively uncritical assessment of the Soviet development see Джидров, П. (1932a).
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radical transformation of the economy, neither temporarily nor permanent-
ly.69 The crucial argument against it that, even if implemented temporarily, it 
would totally suffocate private activity and thus the economic system would 
lose its essential features. If a centrally planned economy would be intro-
duced once, according to the Bulgarian authors, a coming back to market 
principles in better times would hardly be possible.70
4.1.5. Agrarian Economy vs. Industrial Economy
But even if a consensus for the market principle is thus present, the 
question as to which the relevant markets for the country’s future economy 
should be is to be additionally posed. It is not difficult to discern that this is-
sue is the topic of agrarian vs. industrial economy. Communist propaganda 
after 1944 raised one of its major objections against the “bourgeois” econo-
mists that they have left the country in the “medieval agricultural structures” 
and that they have not actively proposed industrialization for Bulgaria.71 This 
is to a certain extent true. The economists in the analyzed periodicals would 
indeed not support an aggressive industrialization of Bulgaria as practiced 
after 1944.72 There seems to be a consensus that the comparative advantage 
in the 1920s and 1930s is in agricultural production. This, however, does not 
mean that the economists were pure proponents of the status quo. Instead, 
in various publications the inefficiency of the current structure of the agri-
cultural sector is heavily criticized.73 In the end, an evolutionary rather than 
(the later communist) revolutionary path is chosen, where improvement can 
be reached via voluntary unions like the ones proposed by the cooperative 
movement,74 not by violent nationalization and urbanization.
4.1.6. Economic Policy and Its Relationship to Social Issues
As pointed out above, the debate on structural policy issues is not only 
a purely economic one. The Bulgarian economists, mostly trained in the tra-
dition of the German Historical School, follow their academic teachers in 
showing that economics without being embedded in a larger context is not 
sufficient. This means that when discussing e.g. the role of government in 
economic policy, not only economic, but also sociological and social policy 
considerations are to be taken into account.75 The economic community 
69 See Бобчев, K. (1933б).
70 See Кинкел, М. (1933), p. 417. This consensus of the mainstream is, however, not shared by authors 
of AESP, see e.g. Джидров, П. (1932б).
71 See e.g. Haтан, Ж. (1964), pp. 221–233.
72 See Бобчев, К. (1931б), p. 486.
73 See e.g. Яранов, Ат. (1931).
74 See Бобчев, К. (1930), pp. 215–216, as well as Мишайков, Д. (1935).
75 This is even more so the case in the reviews of the AESP, where economic and social aspects are 
explicitly treated with equal attention. An analysis of the problems of unemployment can serve as a 
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realizes that all sophisticated policy advice might become worthless if the 
political and social order collapses due to the social repercussions of the 
recommendations.76 Bearing in mind the development in Germany in the be-
ginning of the 1930s, this seems to be a far-sighted observation. Walter Euck-
en’s starting point for his theory of order (Ordnunugstheorie), which began 
evolving exactly at that time, is the so called interdependence of orders, i.e. 
precisely the fact of the relatedness of all economic (and social) policy which 
the Bulgarian economists intuitively see.77 In contrast, the Austrian School 
economists like Friedrich A. von Hayek and Ludwig von Mises insufficiently 
took into account the issue of the political and social dangers of deflation, as 
Hayek himself confesses in the 1970s.78
4.2. Cyclical Policy: What Are the Appropriate Short-
term Policies for Bulgaria During the Crisis?
In the previous chapter, the first layer of the economic policy debate was 
disclosed, that of determining the structural parameters of Bulgarian econo-
my. The timing of those measures is mostly a long-term one, which under-
scores the fact that the majority of Bulgarian economists were arguing that 
the crisis is co-driven by the structural deficiencies of the country’s economy. 
The Depression plaguing the country, however, could in their eyes also de-
mand for some specifically anti-crisis measures which should alleviate the 
hardships of the slump. For this it is important to clarify here the positioning 
of the Bulgarian debate in the broader European context. Most importantly, 
Keynes had not yet published his General Theory. Politicians in charge of 
economic policy thus do not yet have the “scientific justification” for anti-cy-
clical policies which the British economist gave them with his reputation after 
1936. In this way the Bulgarian debate is at the verge of these changing theo-
retical paradigms and reflects the great uncertainty which this quantitatively 
unique depression poses to both politicians and their economic advisors.79
The following figure can clarify the strata of the debate, distinguishing be-
tween the broader context of structural policy issues (including social policy) 
from the previous chapter and the directly cyclical responses of short-term 
character dealt with below.
good example: see Григоров, К. (1932) or Николов, Д. (1934).
76 See e.g. Цанков, Ал. (1932), pp. 22–24.
77 For a good exposition of this embeddedness of economic and social policy see Чолаков, Ст. 
(1932), pp. 146–148.
78 See Hayek, F. A. (1975).
79 For some pre-Keynesian reasoning on the role of easy money see Чакалов, Ac. (1935В), pp. 571–
575.
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4.2.1. Overview of the Competing Theoretical Explanations 
of the Depression
As mostly in the history of economic thought, also at the time of the 
Great Depression one cannot speak of a singular theoretical answer which 
the economic community gives to the challenges of the real world. There 
are, instead, manifold doctrines80 which are in circulation for explaining the 
coming up of this “end of capitalitsm”.81 It is not possible at this place to deal 
with them in detail since each would demand an individual paper of this size. 
Just a brief mentioning of the central topics should suffice.82
The first issue which is to be clarified is the question of the cyclicality of 
market economy.83 This question relates to the topic of whether the major 
source of the crises which accompany economic growth is endogenous or 
exogenous. “Endogenous” would mean that the markets themselves are gen-
erating the observed instability, “exogenous” that it is external impulses that 
disturb the markets’ functioning. To the endogenous group of theories be-
80 A good overview of the circulating doctrines in Bulgaria can be found in Божинов, С. (1930) and, 
even more detailed, in Божинов, С. (1931). Additional doctrines can be found discussed in Киранов, 
Пр. (1931).
81 For this slogan or Keynes’ earlier “end of laissez-faire” as popular terms in the beginning of the 1930s 
see Бобчев, К. (1933б), p. 197.
82 For a summary of the various theories circulating in the debates, see Бобчев, К. (1932б), pp. 55–59. 
Another compact reconstruction can be found in Шишманов, Хр. (1932), p. 64. See also Бочев, Ст. 
(1935), pp. 16–17.
83 There is a consensus on the presence of this phenomenon, see e.g. Михайлов, Н. (1930а), 
pp. 46–47.
Figure 1
DIFFERENT (COMPLEMENTARY) TYPES OF RESPONSES TO THE DEPRESSION
Long-term measures
Short-term measures
}
}
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longs the (very popular among Bulgarians) “overproduction theory”, which 
states that the crises are results of huge surpluses which the markets generate 
without corresponding demand. An example of exogenous explanation of 
the cycle is the theory of the credit boom (Mises calls it the circulation credit 
theory), which later becomes famous under the label “Austrian business cy-
cle theory”.84 This theory, which in the Western debates of the time belongs 
to the mainstream, is shared more intuitively by Bulgarians,85 probably due 
to the popularity of the related theory of the English Currency School of the 
19th century. In its original form, that of Mises of 1912, it is the exaggeration 
and malinvestment of the exogenously ignited credit boom which invariably 
lead to a slump. Whether the Bulgarian credit boom mentioned in the previ-
ous chapters can be seen as such an initiating force is not sure, but what is 
certain in a global perspective is that the late 1920s were characterized by 
such an international credit boom.86
What is common to almost all articles dealing with the causes of the De-
pression, be they exogenous or endogenous, real or monetary, is the belief 
that Bulgarian cyclical difficulties are to a very large extent co-determined 
by the global development, both in the genesis and in the cure of the crisis. 
Thus the parameters for activity of the government and the BNB via cyclical 
policy in the small open economy, as will be seen in the following para-
graphs, are not perceived by the Bulgarian economic community as particu-
larly large. Truly in the spirit of the epoch, in the analyzed publications of the 
period some significant hopes for recovery and prosperity are directed at 
the international level,87 e.g. at the multiple international conferences dealing 
with economic and reparations problems.88 This is not to mean, however, 
that nothing is to be done in Bulgaria: a series of both monetary and fiscal is-
sues are widely discussed and recommended to the politicians for adoption.
4.2.2. Discussion of Monetary Policy Measures
What should be mentioned in the first place regarding the power of mon-
etary measures in Bulgaria of the 1930s is that it is widely perceived by the 
84 Hayek in his Habilitation thesis proposes an endogenous mechanism via the banking system’s ca-
pability to create money. Originally, however, in the version of Mises’ Habilitation, the beginning of 
the cycle is exogenous, e.g. by a decrease of the interest rate of the central bank; see Mises (1912/24) 
and Hayek (1929/76).
85 For a brief overview of the early diagnoses of the crisis among the Bulgarian political and economic 
establishment see Михайлов, Н. (1930б).
86 The characteristically Misesian term of “credit inflation” can be found i.a. in Бобчев, К. (1932б), 
p. 57 or Божинов, С. (1930), p. 78.
87 See e.g. Джидров, П. (1933), pp. 185–186.
88 See e.g. Янулов, Ил. (1933), p. 83, Чакалов, Ас. (1933а), pp. 288-298, as well as Чакалов, Ас. 
(1933б).
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country’s economists as relatively weak.89 The reason for this is the strong 
agricultural character of the Bulgarian economy of the time.90 Certainly farm-
ers obtained credits from the banks, but still the agriculture in the country 
possesses a very low capitalization. In addition, some of the exchange of har-
vested goods was settled in a barter fashion, which additionally diminished 
the power of monetary measures. Nevertheless, for the upcoming industry 
and the non-barter sector of the agricultural sector, the monetary setting is 
not unimportant.91
As pointed out in the section dealing with the facts around the crisis, the 
monetary conditions in Bulgaria after 1928 and thus for the whole period of 
the Depression were determined by the Gold-Exchange Standard. Thus some 
automatism is present for the BNB monetary policy, limiting its discretionary 
power.92 Thus the question arises as to what the proper role of the Central 
Bank is during the crisis and how it should position itself against the severe 
difficulties of the economy.
There are extensive discussions in the Bulgarian economic community 
regarding the functioning of the monetary setting during the 1920s and early 
1930s.93 Since most European countries adopt different types of gold-related 
standards after the inflationary period following the War,94 the debate on 
the suitability of gold as the anchor of the system is applicable both to the 
international and the national monetary question.95 As in the Western de-
bates, the common hoarding and “sterilizing” of gold, as performed by the 
major central banks of the inter-war period, is heavily criticized by the Bulgar-
ian economists. They describe this behaviour as a major impediment to the 
proper working of the standard as compared to its smooth functioning be-
fore 1914.96 Thus there is a criticism towards the concrete implementations 
of the mechanism in the post-war period.
This is, however, not to be confused with a general critique of the idea of 
89 See Бобчев, К. (1930), p. 216.
90 For a discussion of the official (government’s) policy proposal, with a special focus on agriculture, 
see Коларов, Ив. (1930), pp. 281–298.
91 For the role of money and interest rates in a predominantly agricultural economy see Кожухаров, Г. 
(1930), pp. 113–115.
92 For the role of a central bank in the setting of a gold-exchange standard, see Бурилков, Ж. (1935a), 
pp. 86–90.
93 For an analysis of the role of central banks as generators of credit inflation in the expansionary years 
preceding the Depression see Калинов, Т. (1932), pp. 27–31.
94 For a discussion of monetary reforms in different countries before and during the Depression see 
Чакалов, Ас. (1936б).
95 For an overview as to where gold-related standards are still in place 1933 see United Nations (1933), 
pp. 524–525.
96 For the problems related to gold in the crisis see Михайлов, Н. (1932a), pp. 93–94 and pp. 102–
105.
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a gold-related standard itself. The absolutely predominant97 judgment among 
Bulgarian economists is that a fiat money standard as present in the West-
ern discussions, promoted i.a. by Keynes, is not a preferable alternative to 
the gold-related mechanisms.98 The reason for this is probably to be seen in 
the experience during and after the War when various fiat currencies have 
disappeared after tremendous processes of hyperinflation. Thus the belief 
in the stability of government-managed currencies as proposed by Keynes 
is very weak in Bulgaria. The stability of money, seen as one of its essential 
characteristics for assisting the market economy, can only be guaranteed in 
the eyes of Bulgarians by an automatic or semi-automatic mechanism as the 
one established 1928.99
What is the proper role of the BNB in this context?100 Although the is-
sue is legally settled already in the 1920s,101 there is still a persistent discus-
sion on this issue in the analyzed journals.102 The first layer of discussion is 
whether the Central Bank is supposed to be “only” an emission institute or 
also a part of the credit system of commercial banks. There is, understand-
ably, no absolute consensus on this issue.103 What seems to be the majority 
position is that there should be a division of labour between the different 
government banks, leaving the BNB as a unique place of guarding the fi-
nancial system and not being an active player in it in the rank of a (large) 
commercial bank.104 Another discussion is focused on the foreign exchange 
monopoly (камбиален монопол) which was entrusted to the BNB105 and 
which is discussed (mostly very positive) as a seminal part in the stabilization 
of the currency.106
It is difficult to judge from the publications how well the transmission 
mechanisms of the Central Bank’s policy were functioning in that period. Of 
97 An exception is the statement of Alexander Zankoff who sees the gold standard as doomed, see 
Цанков, Ал. (1932), pp. 7-9.
98 There is, however, a discussion as to the difficulties for immediate recovery of the economy due to 
the fixed exchange rate in a gold standard, see Христофоров, Ас. (1935), pp. 259–261.
99 See Бобчев, К. (1931б), pp. 484–485.
100 For the financial situation of BNB in the eve of the crisis see Лещов, П. (1930), pp. 148–150.
101 Again, I thank Dr. Roumen Avramov for his comment on the preceding debate in the 1920s which 
could not be covered in the present paper due to the different period of the analysed journals. The 
most detailed and critical analysis on the proper role of BNB in the analysed period, with a special 
focus on the interrelationship between currency policy and general economic policy and the resulting 
trade-offs, can be found in Тодоров, Д. (1933).
102 For an overview article on this topic see Бурилков, Ж. (1935а). Of interest is also the ensuing 
discussion in the Bulgarian Economic Association, see Стоянов, Н. (1935) or Христов, Н. (1935).
103 For a good exposition of the discussion see Чакалов, Ас. (1935В).
104 See Бобчев, К. (1930), p. 214.
105 For a retrospective six years after the establishment of the foreign exchange monopoly at BNB see 
Владикин, Л. (1930).
106 See e.g. Екимов, Ив. (1934) as well as Икономов, Ст. (1934). For a critical assessment and a 
proposition for liberalization after the Depression see Бурилков, Ж. (1935б). Another note dated 
before the crisis can be found in Лещов, П. (1930).
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course, money and capital markets in Bulgaria at that time were in a really 
nascent state. From this one might infer that the role of thr BNB for financ-
ing the operations of commercial banks was important due to the lack of 
an institutionalized inter-bank lending. Thus the role of the main discount 
interest rate seems to be significant,107 and even more so after the legislation 
proposed in 1932 and passed in 1933 which prohibited commercial banks’ 
interest rates to excel BNB’s discount rate by more than 3 per cent.108 Inter-
estingly, in Bulgaria there are no huge variations in this rate during the ana-
lyzed period, it ranged between 10 per cent in 1930109, 9 per cent in 1931110, 
8 per cent in 1932111, 8 per cent also in 1933112, 7 per cent in 1934113 and 
6 per cent in 1935114. This is a clear indication of the relatively conservative 
policy of BNB during the Depression. Bearing in mind the huge deflation 
rates shown above, one can clearly claim that the real interest rates for the 
economy were extremely high at this critical time.
As a concluding remark to this chapter, it may be interesting to state that 
in spite of the strong deflationary pressures in the Bulgarian economy,115 
within the economic community there seems to be no Keynes-like anti-de-
flationary zeal urging for inflationary policies.116 Such ideas were of course 
discussed in the publications, but were mostly rejected due to the perception 
of severe dangers for the newly established monetary stability in Bulgaria 
emanating from them.117 For the same reason, a devaluation of the curren-
cy, as practiced by many European countries, is discarded by the economic 
community and indeed Bulgaria as one of the very few countries does not 
devalue in the whole of the analyzed period.118
4.2.3. Discussion of Fiscal Policy Measures
The other part of today’s canon in anti-cyclical policy is the role attributed 
to fiscal measures.119 To begin with, the state of the Bulgarian public finances 
107 See e.g. Мишайков, Д. (1934), pp. 631–632.
108 See Бобчев, К. (1933а), p. 117.
109 See Близнаков, Т. (1931), p. 294.
110 See Бобчев, К. (1932), pp. 51–52.
111 See Загоров, Сл. (1933б), p. 49.
112 See Чакалов, Ас. (1934а), p. 114.
113 See Чакалов, Ас. (1935а), p. 39.
114 See Чакалов, Ас. (1936а), p. 45.
115 The highly restrictive policy of the BNB and their possible relation to deflation is discussed in 
Калинов, T. (1932), pp. 35–36.
116 For an early acclaim of such a non-inflationary policy see Чакалов, Ас. (1930), pp. 222–223. Easy 
money policy is also rigorously discarded in Иванов, Ал. (1936), p. 583–584.
117 See e.g. Калинов, Т. (1932), pp. 37–38.
118 For an outstanding contribution on the issue “deflation vs. devaluation” see Христофоров, Ас. 
(1935).
119 An interesting note on the interdependence of monetary and fiscal policy can be found in 
Петков, Й. (1930), pp. 120–121.
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was chronically difficult in the 1920s since heavy war-related reparations had 
been burdened on the country in the Peace treaties.120 However, it might be 
interesting to note that before the crisis there are some years of surpluses in 
the budget,121 which can be interpreted as a sign of rigorous control of the 
budget’s expenditure side. The surpluses not surprisingly disappear,122 mainly 
due to a significant drop in tax revenue as early as in the budget 1930/31.123
An interesting starting point of the discussion is the share of government 
in the national income at that time.124 Since the series of national accounting 
only started developing in this period, one must rely on some estimate fig-
ures. Fortunately, such approximate numbers can be found in JBEA and they 
suggest that the share of government in the economy is about 30 per cent.125 
If one accepts this magnitude, the possible fiscal impulses which the Bulgar-
ian government could generate seem to possess potential impact.
What could these impulses be? Most generally speaking, it would be in-
creased by  government expenditure via a temporarily unbalanced budget, 
e.g. for construction-related public works or direct subsidies for households 
or other sectors of the economy.126 This is the place where the pre-Keyne-
sian127 character of the debate can be most clearly discerned. Such measures 
are, mostly128 discarded by Bulgarian economists in their publications129, e.g. 
by terming them purely “palliative”.130 Interestingly, AESP authors seem more 
sympathetic to such measures.131 The reason for this consensus of the main-
stream is similar to the argument for rejection of the monetary impulses: 
the omnipresent fear of (hyper)inflation,132 regardless whether the financing 
should be by internal or foreign funds.133 An additional restraint in the discus-
120 For relationships between the crisis and the reparations problem see Калинов, Т. (1931).
121 For the surplus in the budget 1929/30 see Чакалов, Ас. (1930), p. 222.
122 For the nominally declining expenditures of the Bulgarian government in the years of the Depres-
sion see Бурилков, Ж. (1934а), p. 102. For an analysis of the 1933/34 state of public finance, see 
Янчулев, Б. (1934б).
123 For the development of tax revenue 1930/1931 as compared to 1929/1930 see Ралев, П. (1930).
124 For some estimates of the nominal national income development see Янчулев, Б. (1934а), p. 87.
125 See Близнаков, Т. (1931), p. 297.
126 See Янулов, Ил. (1931). For a sceptical assessment of the activity of Bulgarian economic policy in 
retrospective at the end of the crisis see Чакалов, Ас. (1936), p. 33.
127 Keynes (having not yet published his General Theory) is very widely cited in the publications, how-
ever mainly due to his participation at the various international conferences and relatively seldom as 
an economic theoretician.
128 For some sympathetic discussion of the economic policy measures in Germany after 1933, see 
Миркович, Р. (1934).
129 A plea for cutting expenses in the crisis for balancing the budget can be found e.g. in Цанков, Ал. 
(1932), p. 21, also in Янулов, Ил. (1933), p. 82; see also Янчулев, Б. (1934а), pp. 85–86.
130 See e.g. Калинов, Т. (1932), p. 33.
131 See e.g. Михайлов, Н. (1933), pp. 254–256.
132 For a strongly anti-inflationary stance see e.g. Загоров, Сл. (1933а), p. 5.
133 Янулов is willing to discuss public works only if they are decided in an international accord and are 
internationally funded, see Янулов, Ил. (1931), pp. 638–640.
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sions is posed by the unclear future of the public debt level of the country 
due to the unsettled reparations problem.134
5. Comparison with Today’s Crisis in Bulgaria: 
Concluding Remarks
The first global financial and economic crisis of the 21st century is still 
(mid-2009) leashing back and forth between the major economic zones, 
strongly distressing also countries like Bulgaria whose interdependence has 
steadily risen over the last years. More than 70 years after the end of the 
Great Depression, economists are still in search of explanations for the crises 
of capitalism. Despite the huge progress in the analytical methods of predic-
tion and the vast computing power behind them, many economists have 
stunningly failed to foresee the upcoming trouble. The public opinion, just 
as in the 1930s, blames the profession for its inability to warn it about the 
dramatic downturn of the cycle.
In such a setting, the history of economic thought can help in a twofold 
manner. First, it is evident that the lines of debate in the current crisis are 
very close to the “fronts” in the 1930s. (New and post) Keynesians demand 
stronger impulses by fiscal and monetary measures, Marxists of all shades 
see the doom of capitalism (finally) coming, liberals blame the (monetary) 
authorities for the earlier easy money as the fatal root of the crisis. Some fear 
particularly the immediate deflationary pressures of the slump, others the 
inflation in the process of recovery. The picture and choir of voices is at least 
as incoherent as it was 70 years ago.
There is, however, some hope, and this is the second side of the history 
of economics “lesson”. The time of crisis is often a time of consolidation of 
paradigms. Society and academia not seldom have made their choices right 
after the crisis as to which the “leading” or “guiding” theory of economic 
dynamics should be for the next decades. For the 40 years after the Great 
Depression, Keynes and Keynesian economics succeeded in displacing all 
other explanations to the margins. In the 1970s, again at a time of crisis, 
monetarism and supply-side economics won the day for the next 30 years. 
Thus today the “battle of ideas” might be devastating for the profession’s im-
age in the impatient eyes of the public, but for economics itself it may be a 
catalyst for gaining the formation of a new prominent paradigm for the next 
years. Which this might be, can only be a matter of speculation at the current 
point of time. The issue is not yet decided.
134 For a theoretically founded public finance perspective on the Bulgarian budgetary problems, see 
Стоянов, П. (1933).
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As regards Bulgaria now and then, one of the most fascinating Bulgar-
ian economists of the 1930s, Dr. Assen Hristoforov, should be quoted at 
this place with his retrospective of the crisis. The author of the current lines 
shares the optimism and confidence which Dr. Hristoforov exhibits in the 
market order when he stated back in 1936: “Despite all these difficulties, 
the capitalist economy has proven far more resilient than many imagined”.135 
The doom scenarios both in a global perspective and especially in the case 
of Bulgaria seem hardly vindicated. Of course, every major crisis is a source 
of manifold economic and especially social troubles. Yes, it destroys plenty 
of prosperity achieved with a lot of painful effort prior to the depression. 
The major difference between the 1930s and today constitutes, however, 
a significant source of optimism. This difference is strictly speaking beyond 
the scope of economics and its history. It is the stability of the political sys-
tem which undoubtedly poses the central distinction between the two crises. 
Dr. Hristoforov himself became a tragic intellectual victim of the disastrous 
aftermath, i.e. the spread of totalitarianisms of all kind before and especially 
after the Second World War. A similar political destabilization process seems 
highly improbable today, also because of the unprecedented degree of eco-
nomic integration worldwide.
Thus economists today, in Bulgaria or anywhere else, fortunately have 
some more time to continue their discourse and find adequate answers to 
the pressing problems of today and even more so of tomorrow. The tenet 
of this paper is that it might be accelerating for this reflection to look back, 
reconstruct and thus trace down the debates in the past. This seems to be 
true in at least two key aspects: finding and reformulating inspiring ideas and 
simultaneously avoiding the mistakes of previous generations can only be 
achieved by knowledge of intellectual history and its evolution.
135 See Христофоров, Ас. (1936a), p. 188.
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